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Abstract
We document that the recent decline in aggregate volatility has been accompanied by a
large increase in firm level risk. The negative relationship between firm and aggregate
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volatility increases after deregulation. Firm volatility is linked to research and develop-
ment spending as well as access to external financing. Further, R&D intensity is also
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Introduction
Over the past 30 years, there has been a decline in aggregate volatility ( McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002)). At the same time, there has been a
large increase in the volatility of firms (Comin (2000), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu
(2001), Comin and Mulani (2003) and Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002)).
Our paper has five parts. We first document the upward trend in various measures
of firm volatility. Second, we present a decomposition of aggregate volatility between the
average volatility of sectors and the correlation of growth across sectors. This decomposition
suggests that the decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decline in the correlation
growth rates across sectors.
Third, we explore whether the firm level trend towards more volatility and the aggre-
gate trend towards more stability are related, or whether the two have moved in opposite
directions by coincidence. The two trends appear to be related. We find that TFP growth
in industries where firms have become more volatile tends to be less correlated with aggre-
gate TFP growth. Across countries, there also seems to be a negative relationship between
aggregate and firm level volatility.
Fourth, we explore the potential explanations for the increase in firm level volatility. We
find support for the idea that firm volatility has increased because of higher competition in
the goods market. We find that firm volatility increases after deregulation. We also find
that the increase in firm level volatility is correlated with high research and development
activity, as well as more access to debt and equity markets. However, we find no evidence
that sectors with more access to external finance have become less correlated with the rest of
the economy, while we do find evidence that sectors with larger increases in R&D investment
have become less correlated with the rest of the economy.
1 The Facts
The decline in aggregate volatility has been documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002).
On the other hand, firm level volatility has increased. Firm level volatility can be mea-
sured using financial data or real data. Using financial data for the US, Comin (2000) and
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Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document an increase in volatility of idiosyn-
cratic stock returns. Using accounting data, Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) and
Comin and Mulani (2003) show an increase the idiosyncratic volatility of employment, sales,
earnings and capital expenditures.
Throughout the paper, we will use aggregate data from the NIPA, and firm level data
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. We will also use the sectoral data set developed by Jorgen-
son and Stiroh (from now on, KLEM data).1
1.1 Volatility: GDP versus Firm Sales
In this section, we document the increase in firm volatility using real measures, like sales,
employment or capital expenditures. Our sample includes all the firms in COMPUSTAT
with, at least, 11 consecutive observations of the relevant variable. Table 1 contains the
basic descriptive statistics for our sample.
- Insert Table 1 Here -
Figure 1 shows the evolution of idiosyncratic and aggregate volatility. Aggregate
volatility (σat ) is defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate (γt) of real
GDP
σat =
"
1
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¢2# 12 (1)
where γ¯t is the average growth rate between t− 4 and t+ 5. For each firm i, we compute
the volatility of the growth rate of sales
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- Insert Figure 1 Here -
We then take the median across all firms present in the sample at time t as our measure
of typical firm volatility
σft = mediani {σi,t}
Figure 1 shows the decline in σat and the increase in σ
f
t . Note also the diﬀerence of scale
between the two measures. Idiosyncratic volatility is an order of magnitude larger than
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aggregate volatility.2 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 25th and 75th percentiles of the
distribution of firm volatility. It is clear that the whole distribution has moved upward, and
that the increase in volatility is even more pronounced at the top.3
- Insert Figure 2 Here -
Our first task is to show the robustness of these findings. The main issues are sample
selection bias and measurement errors. Sample selection is an issue because more small
firms have entered the COMPUSTAT database over time. Since small firms tend to be
more volatile, the changing composition could explain the trend. We deal with this first
issue by controlling for size and age, and showing that the increase in firm volatility holds
within groups of comparable firms. Comin and Mulani (2003) also show that the results
are robust to the inclusion of firms fixed eﬀects.4
The second issue is whether firm level results are economically meaningful. To take
an extreme example, suppose that we live in a world of constant returns without financial
frictions or incentive problems, in which boundaries of organizations do not matter. Plants
could move among firms without any real consequences, yet firms would appear to be
volatile. Firms would simply not be the right units of observation. One could perhaps
argue that M&As fall partly into the category of irrelevant ownership changes. Thus, as a
robustness check, we are going to show that our results are not driven by M&As.
- Insert Figure 3 Here -
Figure 3 shows that the trend increase in firm volatility is not driven by the entry
of young and small firms, or by an upsurge in M&A activity.5 Another way to show that
our results are economically meaningful is to show that they relate to results obtained
in other data sets. Guvenen and Philippon (2005) show that firm volatility measured
across industries in COMPUSTAT is a good predictor of both unemployment risk and wage
inequality measured across the same industries in PSID. Comin, Groshen, and Rabin (2005)
relate firm-level volatility to wage volatility at the occupation level by taking advantage of a
unique data set that contains firm-level and worker-level information for a sample of firms in
Ohio. They document a positive relationship between firm level volatility and the volatility
and dispersion of wages at the occupation level. We will not discuss these results further,
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but we note that they show that our measures of volatility capture real economic risks, not
just measurement error or sample composition bias.
1.2 Turnover of Leaders within Industries
The distribution of firm sizes is famously skewed, and a few firms account for most of the
sales in each industry. Thus, one might argue that firm volatility is relevant only if it aﬀects
the industry leaders. We define turnover in industry I at time t as the probability of leaving
the top quintile of the industry over a five year period,
TopTurnI,t = P
³
Zit+5 < Z
top,I(i)
t+5 | Zit > Ztop,I(i)t
´
,
where Zit is either operating income or market value of firm i at time t, and Z
top,I(i)
t is the
80th percentile of the distribution of Zit at time t in industry I (i). This measure is robust
to the entry of small firms in the particular industry. We then define average turnover as
the median of turnover across all industries.
- Insert Figure 4 Here -
Figure 4 shows the increase in turnover among leaders, for both operating income and
market value. There are too few firms in the sample in the 1950s to obtain a reasonable
estimate of the probability, so we also computed the correlation of ranking over time, using
all the firms and not only the top 20%. For a particular measure Z, we define
RkCorr = Corri∈I (rankI,t (Zit) , rankI,t (Zit+τ ))
where rankI,t (Zit) is the rank of firm i in industry I at time t according to Z. The picture
using market value or operating income is similar to the one in figure 4, and, for the sake
of completeness, we present the results based on labor productivity rankings.
- Insert Figure 5 Here -
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the ranking correlation of firms, over 5 and 10 years,
based on labor productivity. There has been a clear decline in the ranking correlations over
time. We will return to the interpretation of these findings when we discuss product market
competition.
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1.3 Equity Return Volatility
Real data are probably more directly relevant for macroeconomics. However, there are at
least two good reasons to explore financial data as well. The first is that financial data will
allow us to look at firm volatility before World War II. The second is that financial data
can help us disentangle risk from predictable variations in firm dynamics.
We start by looking at equity returns. Let ri,t,m be the return to shareholders of firm
i in month m of year t, and let rVWt,m be the monthly return on the Value Weighted Index.
All the returns come from CRSP. For each firm, we estimate the CAPM model over rolling
windows of 36 months
ri,t,m = βi,trVWt,m + εi,t,m , for m = 1, .., 12
We therefore allow βi,t to vary (smoothly) over time, as seems plausible since we use data
from 1926 to 2004. We take the median across all firms/months observations in year t as
our measure of idiosyncratic financial volatility
σfint = mediani,m (|εi,t,m|)
The nice thing about monthly data is that is allows us to construct non-overlapping annual
measures of firm volatility. We define the explanatory power of the CAPM model as the
share of total firm return volatility that one can explain with the market return, i.e., the
R2 of the CAPM regression.
- Insert Figure 6 Here -
Figure 6 shows the historical decline in the explanatory power of CAPM. CAPM used
to explain 40% of firm returns before the 1950s, but its explanatory power is now around
10%. R2 is the ratio of two volatilities however, and we also want to know what has
happened to the level of idiosyncratic volatility. Figure 7 shows a U-shaped patter for
σfint . Firm volatility was high in the late 1920’s ,and it increased dramatically during the
market crash and the early years of the great depression. It then declined steadily from the
mid 1930’s to the mid 1950’s. At that point in time, we can make the link with the real data
presented in the previous section. Since the mid 1950’s, both real and financial volatility
have increased steadily, with large spikes around the first oil shock and the rise and fall of
6
the internet bubble. For a discussion of the link between financial and real volatility at the
firm level, see Veronesi and Pastor (2003).
- Insert Figure 7 Here -
Finally, note that our measure of firm volatility falls from 2001 to 2003. First, many
firms have delisted from the stock exchanges, and delisting is more common for small, risky
firms. Second, holding constant the composition of the sample, there has been a decrease
in firm volatility. This is not unprecedented. The same happened in the early 1990s, and
we expect firm volatility to start increasing again in the near future.
1.4 Credit Ratings and Credit Spreads
If firms have really become more risky, then this should also be reflected in corporate
bond spreads and corporate bond ratings. For the spread, we use Moody’s seasoned Aaa
corporate bond yield minus the 10-year treasury rate. For bond ratings, we use S&P long
term domestic issuer credit rating from COMPUSTAT, coded from 2 for AAA to 27 for D
(default). We first regress the rating on firm level characteristics (age, assets, sales, SIC
code), and we then average the residuals across firms. Figure 8 shows that the Aaa spread
over treasury has increased overtime, and also that the average credit rating of firms in
COMPUSTAT has deteriorated. Both trends suggest an increase in risk, consistent with
the increase in cash flow volatility. For more on this topic, see Campbell and Taksler (2003).
- Insert Figure 8 Here -
Historical default rates on corporate bonds have also varied a lot over time. The average
default rate from 1900 to 1943 was 1.7%. It dropped to a mere 0.1% from1945 to 1965 (Sylla
(2002)). It then increase again, to 0.64% between 1970 and 1985, and to 1.85% between
1986 and 2001 (Moody’s, 2002). These evolutions are also consistent with the importance
of rating agencies. These agencies played an important role before World War II, became
largely irrelevant in the 1950s and 1960s, and have regained their previous importance in
the past 30 years (Sylla (2002)).
Conclusion 1: Firm level risk has increased over the past 50 years.
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Conclusion 2: Firm level risk was higher in the 1920s and 1930s than in the 1950s and
1960s.
2 Sectoral Evidence
We have established that the aggregate stabilization of the US economy has coincided with a
large increase in firm level risk. However, in a statistical sense, this is only one observation.
Our goal in this section is to explore sectoral dynamics and see how they relate to firm
volatility. We are first going to show that the decline in aggregate volatility is accounted
for by a decrease in the co-movement of the diﬀerent sectors, and not by a decrease in the
average volatility of each sector. Second, we are going to show that sectors in which firms
have become more volatile have typically become less correlated with the aggregate.
Sectoral data comes from Jorgenson and Stiroh’s 35 KLEM data set.6
2.1 Decomposition of Aggregate Volatility
We now perform a decomposition of the aggregate variance of the growth rate of real value
added, TFP and real value added per worker into sector variances and correlations. Let
γs,t be the growth rate of the particular variable in sector s at time t, and let ωsecst be
the share of sales for sector s in the aggregate sales in the economy. Also, let V ([Zτ ]t+5t−4)
denote the variance of {Zt−4, Zt−3, ... Zt, ... Zt+4, Zt+5} for any generic variable Z and
Cov([Zτ ]t+5t−4, [Yτ ]
t+5
t−4) be the covariance between {Zt−4, Zt−3, ... Zt, ... Zt+4, Zt+5} and
{Yt−4, Yt−3, ... Yt, ... Yt+4, Yt+5}. By definition, the aggregate growth rate is
γt =
X
i
γs,tωsecs,t .
Then, using the definition of the variance,
V ([γτ ]t+5t−4) ≡
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
ÃX
i
γs,τωsecs,τ −
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
X
i
γs,τωsecs,τ
!2
.
For simplicity, suppose that ωsecs,t = ωsecs for all the sectors i and all years t. Then, V ([γτ ]t+5t−4)
can be written as follows:7
V ([γτ ]t+5t−4) =
X
s
(ωsecs )
2 V ([γs,τ ]t+5t−4)| {z }
Variance Component
+
X
s
X
j 6=s
ωsecs ωsecj Cov([γs,τ ]t+5t−4, [γj,τ ]
t+5
t−4)| {z }
Covariance Component
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Hence, the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales is decomposed into two terms -
the first is related to the sector level variance of sales (variance component) and the second
reflects the covariances between the growth rates of sales at diﬀerent sectors (covariance
component).
- Insert Figure 9 Here -
The first two rows in Figure 9 show the evolution of the variance and covariance
components of the variance of the growth rate of aggregate value added, aggregate value
added per worker and TFP. The variance component of all three variables displays a hump-
shaped pattern over time, with no obvious decline over our sample period, 1959 to 1996. On
the other hand, for all three variables, we can observe that there has been a decline since
the 1970’s in the covariance of growth across sectors. For value added per worker and TFP
there has been an important decline in the covariance of growth over our sample period,
while for value added growth there has been no trend.
For the three variables, the covariance component is substantially larger than the vari-
ance component. The diﬀerence in magnitude ranges from twice larger (TFP growth) to
an order of magnitude larger (value added growth). As a result, the relevant component to
understand the dynamics of aggregate volatility is the covariance of growth across sectors.
The covariance component is aﬀected by the sectoral variance and by the correlation
of a sector with the others. To increase further our understanding we also compute the
correlation component. Specifically, we define first the correlation of each sector with the
other sectors:
Corrsecs,t =
X
j 6=s
ωsecjP
h 6=s ωsech
Corr([γs,τ ]t+5t−4, [γj,τ ]
t+5
t−4) , (3)
Then we define aggregate correlation as a weighted average of the sectoral correlations:
Corrat =
X
s
ωsecs Corrsecs,t .
The third row in Figure 9 shows a clear decline in aggregate correlation for value added,
TFP and value added per worker growth over time. Hence, we conclude that, in order to
understand the decline in aggregate volatility, we should try to understand what drives this
decline in the correlation between sectors. The results presented in this section are based
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on the KLEM sectoral data set. We have obtained similar results for the decomposition of
aggregate volatility using manufacturing data from the BLS.
Conclusion 3: The decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decrease in the
correlation of growth rates across sectors. The contribution of average sector volatility is
less important.
2.2 Firm Volatility and Sector Co-movements
We now ask if the decline in co-movement across sectors is linked to the increase in volatility
within each sector. We start from our measure of idiosyncratic firm volatility σi,t defined
in equation (2). We aggregate this measure within each sector to obtain a sector specific
measure of firm volatility
σsecs,t = meani∈s(σi,t)
On the other hand, we have the sector specific correlation measure, Corrsecs,t , defined in
equation (3). We run the following regressions
Corrsecs,t = αi + βt+ γσsecs,t + εs,t
Table 2 shows the results when the dependent variable is the correlation of value added,
employment, labor productivity and TFP. We estimate a negative γ in all specifications, and
it is significant for the last three. Of course since both σsecs,t and Corrsecs,t are autocorrelated
we use Newey-West to assess the significance of β. As a robustness check, we estimate the
relationship between sectoral correlation and firm volatility replacing the time trend by
sector dummies. In this alternative specification we continue to obtain a negative estimate
of γ that is statistically significant.
- Insert Table 2 Here -
To have a more graphical image of the relationship between firm volatility and sectoral
correlation, Figures 10a and 10b show the change in the correlation of output per worker
against the change in the volatility of firms between 1964 and 1977 (10a) and between 1978
and 1991 (10b) for the 35 sectors in our sample. In these figures, there is a clear and
significant negative cross-sectional relationship between the change in firm volatility and
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the change in sectoral correlation for the two periods that cover the whole time-span of
our sample. In various robustness checks, we have found that the results for productivity
(either value added per worker, or TFP) are robust, while the results for quantities (either
employment or value added) are not always significant.
- Insert Figure 10a Here -
- Insert Figure 10b Here -
Conclusion 4: Co-movement has decreased more in sectors where firm volatility has
increased more.
3 International Evidence
So far our exploration has been restricted to the US because of data availability. Some
research, however, has been done on non-US data. Frazzini and Marsh (2002) do not
find the same increase in firm volatility in the UK. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show an
increase in France, especially for listed firms. Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) show
that the CAPM explains a larger part of firm equity returns in emerging market than in
developed economies.
- Insert Table 3 Here -
Adding to this evidence we explore the evolution of firm-level volatility using a short
panel of international firms in the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL data set. This sample covers
publicly traded companies between 1993 and 2004 in more than 80 countries, representing
over 90% of the world’s market capitalization, including coverage of over 96% of European
market capitalization and 88% of Asian market capitalization. Due to the short nature of
the panel we compute volatility using 4-year rolling windows. Specifically, for every firm
in the sample, we compute the standard deviation of the growth rate of employment on a
rolling window of 4 consecutive years. Our measure of firm volatility in year t is either the
mean or the median of the standard deviations across all firm in year t. Table 3 reports
the evolution of these measures of firm volatility. We can observe a clear increase in both
measures of firm-level volatility during the nineties. Unfortunately, the panel is too short
to see if the upward trend in firm volatility holds in the post-war period.
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- Insert Figure 11a Here -
The length of the panel limits the time series exploration of firm volatility, but it does
not preclude us from investigating the cross-section determinants of volatility. In particular,
one interesting issue that we can address is the relationship between income per capita and
volatility. At the aggregate level, Figure 11a shows a well known fact from, for example,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Namely, that there is a negative relationship between the
volatility and the initial level of income per capita. In this case, the sample contains a
cross-section of 70 countries during the 1990’s. At the firm-level, though, we do not see
any relationship between the firm-level volatility in a country and income per capita.8 In
particular, Figure 11b illustrates this lack of association between median firm volatility of
employment growth and income per capita in a cross-section of 57 countries. This result
holds irrespective of whether we aggregate firm volatilities at the country level using the
mean or the median.
- Insert Figure 11b Here -
Finally, we wish to explore the relationship between aggregate and firm-level volatility
in the cross-section of countries. Figure 12a plots the scatter plot for our sample of 58
countries which includes both developed and developing economies. It is clear from this
figure that when we look at all the countries in the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL there is no
relationship between aggregate and firm-level volatility. This, however, may be the result
of the noisiness of the data for some low income countries..
- Insert Figure 12a Here -
To mitigate this problem, we explore the sub-sample of 28 OECD economies. Figure
12b contains the scatter plot of aggregate and firm volatility for each of our cross-section of
OECD economies during the 90’s. There we can observe a statistically-significant negative
relationship between aggregate and firm volatility. Interestingly, this negative relationship
between aggregate and firm volatility remains significant after controlling for the log of
income per capita, the log average size of firms in a country or the log number of firms in
a country.
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- Insert Figure 12b Here -
We do not want to push too far this relationship between aggregate and firm volatility in
the cross-section of OECD countries, but, in any case, it supports the conclusions we have
drawn previously while exploring the post-war panel of US sectors. Namely, that there seems
to exist a negative correlation between the evolution of aggregate and firm-level volatilities.
Conclusion 5: Aggregate volatility and income per-capita are negatively related across
countries
Conclusion 6: Firm volatility and income per-capita are uncorrelated across countries
Conclusion 7: Firm and aggregate volatility are negatively related among OECD coun-
tries
4 Theoretical Discussion
We are now going to discuss a few possible explanations for the facts that we have uncovered
so far. In the last part of the paper, we will try to test these explanations. On the link
between sectoral diversification, volatility and growth, see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
Imbs and Wacziarg (2004), and Koren and Tenreyro (2004).
The first potential explanation is that aggregate stabilization led to more risk taking by
firms. The cause of the aggregate stabilization could be luck, or better monetary policy.
The link with individual risk taking could be the following. Suppose that reallocation is
ineﬃciently low in recessions. Then entrepreneurs may be reluctant to start risky ventures
because of the eventuality that they fail at a time where the economy is in a bust. This
applies equally to human capital (unemployment risk) or physical capital (fire sales). A
decline in aggregate volatility could therefore lead to more individual risk taking.
Other explanations assume that there is a change at the firm level that drives the increase
in firm volatility and leads, directly or indirectly, to a decrease in aggregate volatility. Some
of these explanations start from an increase in competition in the goods market. It is easy
to see how competition can drive up firm level risk. The explanations diﬀer in how they
link competition to aggregate volatility. One explanation, formalized in Philippon (2003) is
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that more competition leads firms to adjust their prices faster, which reduces the impact of
aggregate demand shocks. While intuitively appealing, the simple sticky price explanation
cannot be complete because it also implies more volatile inflation, contrary to the evidence.9
The third explanation, formalized in Comin and Mulani (2005), is that more competition
leads to a decline in the correlation of sectoral TFP shocks. To see why this could be the
case, suppose that firms decide how much to invest in the development of two kinds of inno-
vations. Idiosyncratic, R&D innovations are patentable and benefit mostly the innovator.
General innovations — such as the mass production system, and other organizational innova-
tions, improved process controls, product development, testing practices and pre-production
planning, new personnel and accounting practices — are hard to patent and can potentially
aﬀect all the firms in the economy. An increase in R&D leads to market turnover and to
a reduction in the value of market leaders. Since the marginal value of general innovations
is proportional to the value of market leaders, an increase in R&D leads to a decline in
the development of general innovations. As a result, the correlation of TFP growth across
sectors declines and so does aggregate volatility.
Finally, financial innovation could explain our facts. Financial innovation can lead
to more risk taking (see Arrow (1971), Obstfeld (1994)). Financial innovation can also
work through the competition channel, since financial development favors entry of new
competitors. On the other hand, financial innovation could prevent credit crunches, make
collateral constraints less binding (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)) and lead to
lower aggregate volatility.
5 Product Market Competition
We have already shown that turnover at the top of industries has significantly increased
over time. See figures 4 and 5. Is competition behind this evolution?
5.1 Profit Margins
Figure 13 shows the evolution of profit margins. The profit margin for firm i at time t is
defined as
πit =
OIit
Sit
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where OIit is operating income and Sit is sales. The key question is how to aggregate profit
margins. One way is to take the mean across all firms
π¯non−weightedIt = meani∈I (πit) .
Another way is to take the sales-weighted average, or equivalently
π¯weightedIt =
X
i∈I
OIitX
i∈I
Sit
- Insert Figure 13 Here -
As figure 13 shows, the two measures have had very diﬀerent evolutions. The stability
of the weighted margin means that leaders are as profitable today as they were 50 years
ago. However, firms are less likely to remain leaders for very long. The decline of the
non-weighted margin is due to the entry of new firms (that often have negative cash flows)
and the downfall of previous leaders.
Conclusion 8: Aggregate margins have remained stable because, conditional on being an
industry leader, the margins of today are just as high as the margins of yesterday. The key
evolution is that firms are less likely to remain leaders now than they were 50 years ago.
5.2 Evidence from Deregulation
The results presented in this section follow Irvine and Pontiﬀ (2005) who document that
return volatility increases after episodes of deregulation.
Some industries have been deregulated. For these industries, we can estimate the volatil-
ity of firms before and after deregulation, relative to firms in industries that do not experi-
ence deregulation. This is a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation.
For each firm, we define σit like in equation 2 except that we use only the past 5 years
of data to make the timing more transparent.
σit = std.dev (γiτ )τ=t−4...t
- Insert Figure 14 Here -
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We are therefore using a purely backward looking measure of volatility. For each year,
we measure the volatility of firm in industry I against firms in the other industries. The
deregulated industries are Airlines (1978), Entertainment (1984), Gas (1978), Trucking
(1980), Banking (1994), Railroad (1980), Electricity (1978) and Telecom (1982). Figure
14 shows the evolution of the backward looking relative volatility measure around the year
where deregulation happens. The increase in firm volatility is not very large (about 1.5%
after 5 years), but it is statistically significant. In the underlying diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
regression, the p-value of the test that volatility at t+5 is the same as volatility at t-1 is
0.0123.
Conclusion 9: Deregulation can account for some of the increase in firm volatility.
6 R&D, Innovations and Firm Dynamics
Following the Schumpeterian tradition, Comin and Mulani (2005) argue that the observed
increase in R&D-driven innovations may be responsible for the increase in the turnover in
market leadership and firm volatility. Consistent, with this idea, Chun, Kim, Lee, and Morck
(2004) find that firm specific stock return volatility is higher in industries that invest more
in information technology. To explore this hypothesis we estimate the following regression
in a panel of 35 2-digit sectors in the US during the period 1950-2003:
σs,t = αs + βt+ γRDs,t + s,t,
where σst denotes the measure of firm-level volatility in sector s at time t, αs is a sector-
specific intercept and RDs,t denotes total R&D expenses over total sales in sector s during
year t.
- Insert Table 4 Here -
The first four columns in Table 4 report the estimates of γ for various measures of
volatility. In all the cases there is a positive and statistically significant association between
R&D and firm volatility. These estimates are robust to substituting the time trend for time
dummies. Further, the estimated coeﬃcient is economically significant. R&D intensity has
increased by about 2 percent since the mid 50’s. This implies that the increase in R&D
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could account for an increase in firm volatility of between 1.5 and 6 percentage points of
the total increase of approximately 10 percentage points.
Of course, there is a long way between correlation and causation. Further, the reserve
causality argument is particularly plausible in this context. Namely, when it is easier to take
over market leaders, and therefore there is more firm volatility, firms have more incentives
to invest in R&D to materialize this possibility.
One crude way to check whether R&D has a positive eﬀect on firm volatility consists
on exploring whether the increase in firm volatility after 1980 has been larger in the sectors
that invested more heavily in R&D before 1980. This is the motivation for the following
specification:
σ¯s,POST = α+ βσ¯s,PRE + γRDs,PRE + εs (4)
By fixing R&D prior to 1980 we avoid the reverse eﬀect of volatility on R&D. In this
specification, this comes at the cost of reducing the initial panel to a cross-section of incre-
ments in volatility. Table 5 reports the estimates for γ in equation (4) for various measures
of firm volatility. For all of them, there is a positive eﬀect of pre-1980 R&D intensity on
post-1980 firm volatility. This eﬀect is statistically significant at conventional levels for the
mean of the volatility of sales and sales per worker and for the median of the volatility of
sales. For the median volatility of sales per worker, the eﬀect of R&D before to 1980 on
firm volatility after 1980 becomes significant if we restrict to the non-primary economy.
- Insert Table 5 Here -
To increase our understanding of the interaction between firm volatility and R&D, we
proceed to estimate the following equation:
σst = αs + βt+ γ(j)RDs,t−j + st,
for values of j between 10 and -10. For concreteness, we focus now on the median volatility
of sales per worker as a measure of σst, though the results are very robust to the other
volatility measures. Figure 15a reports the estimate of γ for various lags (j) and figure 15b
reports the associated p-values (in an inverse scale) after computing Newey-West standard
errors. In these figures it is very clear the lead-lag relationship between R&D and volatility.
17
As we suspected, current volatility has a significant impact on future R&D that peaks
approximately at t + 3. However, there is a very apparent eﬀect of past R&D on current
volatility That peaks at t − 5. This eﬀect is always positive, statistically significant and
typically larger than the contemporaneous correlation between R&D and firm volatility.
- Insert Figure 15a Here -
- Insert Figure 15b Here -
Finally, since R&D seems to be an important determinant of firm volatility, we can
explore how R&D aﬀects the co-movement of sectoral growth. To this end, we estimate the
following equation:
Corrsecs,t = αs + βt+ γRDs,t + st,
where Corrsecs,t is defined in expression (3). The estimates of γ when Corrsecs,t is measured by
the correlations of productivity and TFP growth are −3 and −2.4 respectively with p-values
of 2%. Hence, the increase in R&D is associated to a decline of between 5 and 6 percentage
points in the sectoral correlation of TFP or productivity growth of the observed decline
of between 10 and 25 percentage points. These estimates are robust to replacing the time
trend by time dummies.
Conclusion 10: Increases in R&D intensity are correlated with significant increases in
firm volatility.
Conclusion 11: Growth in sectors with larger increases in R&D spending has become
less synchronized with aggregate growth in the economy.
7 Financial Development
Before the great depression, financial markets for high risk companies were very active.
Corporate defaults were common, and IPOs were numerous (see above for defaults, and
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) for IPOs). In the 1950’s and 1960’s, defaults were extremely
rare, and IPOs almost disappeared. The high yield market was reinvented in the 1970’s, and
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IPOs reached historical highs in the 1990’s. Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) find that
firm specific volatility is linked to the openness of capital markets across emerging countries,
but not to openness to trade. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) find that, among french firms,
volatility increased more for publicly traded companies following financial deregulation.
On the macroeconomic side, there are many models, and a lot of evidence to support
the idea that financial development can reduce aggregate volatility. Recently, Campello
(2003) find that industry markups are more counter-cyclical when leverage ratios are high,
and Braun and Larrain (2004) show that industry that rely more on external finance are
more sensitive to aggregate shocks, and that the eﬀect is stronger in countries that are less
financially developed.
We were not able to find a plausible instrument for financial development, so we can
only present reduced form regressions. We study if industries that use a lot of external
finance also experience large increases in firm volatility
σs,t = αs + βt+ γRDRDs,t + γEQEQs,t + γLDLDs,t + s,t,
For sector s at time t, EQs,t is the ratio of total issues of common and preferred stocks over
total sales, and LDs,t is the ratio of total long term debt issues over total sales. As before,
σs,t is the median firm volatility, measured between t-4 and t+5, and RDs,t is total R&D
expenditures over total sales. We obtain the following results for our sample of 35 sectors
between 1952 and 2002:
γRD γEQ γLD
Coeﬃcient .974 .267 .106
St. Error .125 .070 .024
.
Conclusion 12: Increases in firm volatility are associated with significant increases in
R&D intensity, and with significant increases in debt and equity issuances.
We can also look at the link between external finance and sectoral correlations (using
the correlation of the growth rate of TFP in sector s at time t with the aggregate TFP
growth of the economy):
Corrsecs,t = αs + βt+ γRDRDs,t + γEQEQs,t + γLDLDs,t + st ,
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and we find
γRD γEQ γLD
Coeﬃcient -1.93 .256 .109
St. Error .619 .322 .102
The negative link between TFP co-movement and R&D appears robust, but there is no
significant link with external financing
Conclusion 13: R&D intensity is associated with decreases in co-movement, while ex-
ternal financing is not.
8 Conclusion
We document a widespread increase in firm level volatility, which, we argue, is primarily
due to more competition in product markets. We show that competition is best viewed as
an increase in the turnover of market shares, as opposed to the more traditional approach
emphasizing average markups, or indexes of concentration. We find that average industry
profit margins have been roughly stable over the past 50 years, because, at any point in
time, industry leaders account for most of the sales, and the profit margins conditional
on being a leader have not changed much. However, we show that the expected length of
leadership by any particular firm has declined dramatically.
We then explore the possible causes for the increase in competition, and we find several
explanations. First, we show that firm volatility increases after deregulation. Second,
volatility increases more in industries that experience larger increases in R&D investment,
and in industries that issue more debt and equity.
The contrast between the decline in aggregate risk and the increase in idiosyncratic firm
volatility is striking, and we present evidence that the two trends are related. Stock and
Watson (2002) show that most of the decline in volatility is due to smaller shocks. We bring
two new pieces to the puzzle. First, we show that the decline in the volatility of aggregate
shocks is primarily due to a decrease in the correlation of shocks across sectors, rather than
a decline in sectoral volatility. Second, we show that the correlation of a particular sector
with the rest of the economy declines more when firm volatility within this sector increases
20
more. Therefore, we claim that there is a negative relationship between firm and aggregate
volatility.
Several theories can help us understand this connection, and we classify them in two
broad categories. The first group takes the aggregate shocks as given and emphasizes
a decline in a particular amplification mechanism, like the credit multiplier or nominal
rigidities. We do not find supporting evidence for a role of the investment-financial multiplier
in the decline in aggregate volatility. Our data does not allow us to explore the role of
nominal rigidities. The second group of explanations argues that competition can lead to
a reduction in the correlation of TFP shocks across sectors. We find evidence supportive
of this hypothesis: R&D spending at the industry level predicts both an increase in firm
volatility within the industry, and a decrease in the co-movement of the industry with the
rest of the economy.
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Appendix
In this appendix we derive the decomposition of the variance of aggregate growth into
the variance of sectoral growth and the covariance of growth across sectors. The growth
rate of the aggregate variable of interest (γt) is related to sectoral growth (γs,t) as follows:
γt =
X
s
ωsecs γs,t,
where ωsecs,t are the relevant sectoral weights. Aggregate variance of γτ between τ = t − 4
and τ = t+ 5 can the be expressed as:
V ([γτ ]t+5t−4) =
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
ÃX
s
γs,τωsecs −
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
X
s
γs,τωsecs
!2
Imposing the restriction that sectoral weights are constant during the interval [t − 4,
t+ 5], we can express aggregate variance as:
V ([γτ ]t+5t−4) =
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
ÃX
s
ωsecs
Ã
γs,τ −
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
γs,τ
!!2
Expanding and manipulating we obtain the variance-covariance decomposition.
V ([γτ ]t+5t−4) =
1
10
t+5X
τ=t−4
⎛
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X
j
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Variance Component
+
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j 6=s
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t+5
t−4)| {z }
Covariance Component
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Notes
1We have checked the robustness of our findings using BLS sectoral data.
2Another way to measure firm volatility is to estimate an auto-regressive process and
compute the volatility of the innovations. The increase in volatility is the same if we measure
it in that way.
3For a decomposition of firm dynamics into permanent and transitory shocks, see Franco
and Philippon (2004)
4Comin and Mulani (2003) also allow for cohort-specific age and size eﬀects, and for
auto-correlated errors.
5This is not to say that M&As are not important. They do not matter much here because
we use the median to aggregate across firms. If we had used the mean as our benchmark
for figure 1, then some large mergers would have aﬀected our measure, and removing these
mergers would have made a diﬀerence.
6All of our results also hold using BLS manufacturing data.
7See Appendix for the derivation details.
8This lack of association between firm-level volatility and income per capita persist if
we compute firm volatility after filtering firm growth from shocks to aggregate growth.
Specifically, we regress firm growth on country-time specific dummies and compute the
standard deviation of the residuals to measure firm volatility.
9This is because the standard sticky price model assumes a constant velocity, hence
y = m− p and , for given volatility of m, the only way to decrease the volatility of y is to
increase the volatility of p. Sticky price models are one example in the class of models with
counter-cyclical markups. Models with real counter-cyclical markups would not make the
counter-factual prediction.
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Table 1: Firm Level Summary Statistics  
Year Number of Firms Average Real Sales Median Sales Volatility
1955 810 1.30 0.096
1956 829 1.35 0.093
1957 849 1.38 0.090
1958 927 1.22 0.084
1959 982 1.28 0.081
1960 1589 0.87 0.095
1961 1727 0.84 0.098
1962 1952 0.82 0.099
1963 2171 0.81 0.099
1964 2351 0.83 0.098
1965 2506 0.86 0.100
1966 2680 0.89 0.108
1967 2861 0.89 0.114
1968 3450 0.82 0.120
1969 3633 0.92 0.122
1970 3705 0.91 0.128
1971 3898 0.92 0.141
1972 4073 0.96 0.139
1973 4502 1.02 0.134
1974 6110 0.88 0.139
1975 6175 0.84 0.138
1976 6224 0.91 0.139
1977 6262 0.97 0.142
1978 6187 1.04 0.146
1979 6081 1.15 0.149
1980 6187 1.18 0.151
1981 6226 1.17 0.157
1982 6530 1.09 0.167
1983 6771 1.05 0.174
1984 6827 1.09 0.179
1985 7135 1.06 0.184
1986 7394 1.03 0.188
1987 7448 1.11 0.190
1988 7295 1.20 0.192
1989 7202 1.27 0.187
1990 7239 1.33 0.181
1991 7375 1.27 0.175
1992 7786 1.22 0.171
1993 8907 1.11 0.160
1994 9288 1.17 0.163
1995 10101 1.18 0.172
1996 10282 1.23 0.180
1997 10020 1.33 0.197
1998 10286 1.39 0.212
1999 10294 1.51 0.211
2000 9819 1.76 0.207
Average Sales in 2000 Billion Dollars
Sectoral 
correlation of 
Sectoral 
correlation of 
Sectoral 
correlation of 
Sectoral 
correlation of 
growth in value 
added
growth in 
employment
growth in labor 
productivity growth in TFP
-0.036 -0.23 -0.264 -0.22
(0.096) (.12) (.126) (.08)
N 1011 1011 1011 1011
year Number of  firms Median Volatility Average Volatility
1995 2685 0.0694 0.1301
1996 2752 0.0737 0.1417
1997 2762 0.0872 0.1587
1998 3429 0.0999 0.1859
1999 3652 0.1126 0.1983
2000 3711 0.1205 0.2161
2001 1831 0.1281 0.2269
Table 3: Firm Level Volatility in the World
Avg. Firm 
Volatility
Firm volatility measured in COMPUSTAT. Sector correlation measured in Jorgenson's dataset. All regressions 
include a time trend and sector fixed effects. Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent 
Variable 
Table 2: Sectoral Correlation and Firm Volatility, Panel Regression, 35 Sectors
Mean Volatility 
of Sales
Mean Volatility 
of Sales per 
Worker
Median Volatility 
of  Sales
Median Volatility 
of Sales per 
Worker
3 2.88 0.65 0.49
(0.93) (0.83) (0.29) (0.21)
N 1260 1258 1260 1258
Mean Volatility 
of Sales
Mean Volatility 
of Sales per 
Worker
Median Volatility 
of  Sales
Median Volatility 
of Sales per 
Worker
1 1.1 0.94) 1.01
(.14) (0.2) (0.12) (0.13)
5.26 5.96 1.98 1.35
(2.27) (2.15) (1) (0.88)
N 35 35 35 35
Firm Vol. pre 
1980
R&D/Sales pre 
1980
R&D/Sales
Newey-West Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include a time trend and sector dummies.
Dependent Variable, Mean Post 1980
Dependent Variable
Table 4: R&D and Firm Volatility, Panel Regression, 1956-1997, 35 sectors
Table 5: R&D and Firm Volatility, Cross-Section of 35 sectors before/after 1980
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Fig. 10a: Firm Volatility and Sectoral Correlation 1964-1977
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Fig. 10b: Firm Volatility and Sectoral Correlation 1978-1991
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Fig. 11a: Aggregate Volatility in a Cross-Section of Countries
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Fig. 11b: Firm Level Volatility in a Cross-Section of Countries
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Fig. 12a: Aggregate and Firm Volatility
Cross-Section of Countries
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Fig. 12b: Aggregate and Firm Volatility
Cross-Section of OECD Countries
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Fig. 15a: Effect of R&D at t-j on Firm Volatility at t
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